Christianity and the Just War Tradition

In the first few centuries following Christ’s Crucifixion, up until the time of Constantine’s conversion to Christianity, many Christians refused military service. Some scholars have speculated that they did so primarily because of the requirement for idolatry rather than on pacifist grounds.

The Roman military traditionally required that all higher ranks, Centurion upward, sacrifice to the emperor; and even though lower ranks did not have to participate actively, they had to be present at the ceremony, swear allegiance to the emperor, and wear a badge bearing the emperor’s effigy.

At the beginning of the fourth century, however, the requirement for idolatry was extended to all ranks in order to identify the Christians who were at the time being subjected to severe persecution.

Those who refused to perform the required idolatry were tortured and executed. In the well-known case of the Forty Martyrs (A.D.316), Licinius, in attempting to rid his forces of Christians, forced forty of them either to renounce Christianity or to lie naked on a frozen lake all night.

Records of Christians in the military are frequently cited as evidence that it was not pacifism, but the expansion of the requirement for idolatry and increased persecution, which caused many Christians to avoid military service. While much of the historical evidence most often cited is undoubtedly accurate, there is another interpretation of the evidence that is more consistent with the available information and that convinces some that many early Christians were also pacifists. Tertullian, writing in A.D. 199, prays “for security to the empire; for protection to the imperial house: for brave armies,” but explicitly prohibits Christians from wearing a sword irrespective of the requirement for idolatry:

But now inquiry is made about this point, whether the military may be admitted unto the faith, even the rank and file, or each inferior grade. To whom there is no necessity for taking part in sacrifices or capital punishments…. One soul cannot serve two masters-God and Caesar. But how will a Christian man war, nay, how will he serve even in peace, without a sword, which the Lord has taken away? The Lord in disarming Peter, unbelted every soldier. No dress is lawful among us, if assigned to any unlawful action.

Another record from the period that expressly prohibits violence (and warfare), but does not address military service, is found in the following passage from Lactantius, tutor to Constantine, writ- ten about A.D. 313:

It is not therefore befitting that those who strive to keep to the path of justice should be companions and sharers in the public homicide. For when God forbids us to kill, He not only prohibits us from open violence, which is not even allowed by the public laws, but he warns us against the commission of those things which are esteemed lawful among men.

Thus it will be neither lawful for a just man to engage in warfare, since his warfare is justice itself, nor to accuse anyone of a capital charge, because it makes no difference whether you put a man to death by word, or rather by sword, since it is the act of putting to death itself which is prohibited. Therefore with regard to this precept of God, there ought to be no exception at all; but that it is always unlawful to put to death a man, whom God willed to be a sacred animal.

One way to reconcile the issues of pacifism and idolatry is to recognize that Christians could serve in the army (perhaps on occupation duty, as part of a police force, or simply as deterrents), with- out necessarily committing violent acts.

This seems to be implied by Origen (A.D. 245) who, in responding to charges by Celsus that Christians were guilty of contemptissima inertia, or most contemptible apathy, because they refused to join in the defense of the state that maintained the communal order, argues that “none fight better for the king than we do…we fight on his behalf, forming a special army-an army of piety-by offering our prayers to God.”

And Marcus Aurelius, in crediting prayer by the great numbers of Christian members of his Thundering Legion with saving the entire unit from perishing from thirst in A.D. 173, observed:

I called out of the ranks those whom we call Christians, and, having questioned them, I perceived what a great multitude of them there were and raged against them: which indeed I should not have done, because I afterward perceived their power. For they did not begin by the contemplation of spears or arms or trumpets (which is hateful to them because of the God which they keep in their conscience…), but by prostrating themselves on the ground.6

Presumably Aurelius “raged against them” because of their unwillingness to fight.

Bainton argues for a similar explanation and concludes that “ecclesiastical authors before Constantine condemned Christian participation in warfare, though not necessarily military service in time of peace.”

We can conclude that, while the expansion of the requirement for idolatry to all ranks in the fourth century did keep Christians from military duty, their service prior to this time was not inconsistent with their pacifist beliefs. Let us now turn to an examination of the basis for this early pacifism.

Early Christianity and Pacifism

The prohibition against Christians engaging in warfare was derived from certain passages from the New Testament that seemed to expressly prohibit doing violence to others. The most poignant of these passages are quoted below:

How blest are the peacemakers: God shall call them his sons.

You have learned that our forefathers were told, “Do not commit murder: and anyone who commits murder shall be brought to judgment.” But what I tell you is this: Anyone who nurses anger against his brother must be brought to judgment. If he abuses his brother he must answer for it to the court; if he sneers at him he will have to answer for it in the fires of hell.

You have learned that they were told. “An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.” But what I tell you is this: Do not set yourself against the man who wrongs you. If someone slaps you on the right cheek, turn and offer him your left. If a man wants to sue you for your shirt, let him have your coat as well. If a man in authority makes you go one mile, go with him two.

You have learned that they were told, “Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.” But what I tell you is this: Love your enemies and pray for your persecutors. And if you greet only your brothers, what is there extraordinary about that? Even the heathen do as much. You must therefore be all goodness, just as your heavenly Father is all good.

They then came forward, seized Jesus, and held him fast.

At that moment one of those with Jesus reached for his sword, drew it, and he struck at the High Priest’s servant and cut off his ear. But Jesus said to him. “Put up your sword. All who take the sword die by the sword.”

Never pay back evil for evil. Let your aims be such as all men count honorable. If possible, so far as it lies with you, live at peace with all men. My dear friends, do not seek revenge, but leave a place for divine retribution; for there is a text which reads, “Justice is mine, says the Lord, I will repay.” But there is another text: “If your enemy is hungry. Feed him; if he is thirsty, give him a drink; by doing this you will heap live coals on his head.” Do not let evil conquer you, but use good to defeat evil.

Of course, these passages cannot be interpreted simply as prohibitions against Christians doing violence to others or to one another. If Christians have this duty because what Christ said is true, then everyone must have the same duty.

Part of the problem with using these passages as the basis for pacifism is that in order to interpret them as espousing pacifism, one must distill certain values from them-for example, submissiveness or nonresistance and argue that such values imply passivity.

But if we adopt this interpretation, then no one should ever serve as a police officer, guard, or in any other position that might require force; and such an extreme reading runs contrary to other passages in the New Testament that recognize the legitimate authority of the state as a keeper of the peace and enforcer of the laws.

In fact, many of the same or similar passages in the New Testament can be interpreted in ways that seem to justify violence in certain circumstances. For example, one might argue that while the New Testament preaches love and warns against hate, it nowhere prohibits violence as a means of distributing justice; it is only violence done in anger or with vengeance that we are warned against. In fact, if we continue the above quotation from Romans, we get a discussion of the legitimate use of force in the name of justice:

Every person must submit to the supreme authorities. There is no authority but by act of God, and the existing authorities are instituted by him; consequently anyone who rebels against authority is resisting a divine institution, and those who so resist have themselves to thank for the punishment they will receive. For government, a terror to crime has no terrors for good behavior.

You wish to have no fear of the authorities? Then continue to do right and you will have their approval, for they are God’s agents working for your good. But if you do wrong, then you will have cause to fear them; it is not for nothing that they hold the power of the sword, for they are God’s agents of punishment, for retribution on the offender.

This passage undoubtedly permits violence as a means of distributing justice and maintaining communal order.

A second problem for a pacifist interpretation is that it requires that one accept both Old Testament and New Testament as presenting different moral standards. Without this discontinuity it is impossible to reconcile pacifism with lex talionis.

If, however, the violence of the Old Testament is understood as a legitimate means of retributive justice rather than as a form of revenge, the two texts are not incommensurate. In the following paragraph Elizabeth Anscombe notes that the “an eye for an eye” passage is often misunderstood in this way:

It is characteristic of pacifism to denigrate the Old Testament and exalt the New: something quite contrary to the teaching of the New Testament itself, which always looks back to and leans upon the Old. How typical it is that the words of Christ “You have heard it said, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, but I say to you…” are taken as a repudiation of the ethic of the Old Testament! People seldom look up the occurrence of this phrase in the juridical code of the Old Testament where it belongs, and is the admirable principle of law for the punishment of certain crimes, such as procuring the wrongful punishment of another by perjury.

People often enough now cite the phrase to justify private revenge; no doubt this was often “heard said” when Christ spoke of it. But no justification for this exists in the personal ethic taught by the Old Testament. On the contrary. What do we find? “Seek no revenge.” (Leviticus xix, 18)…. And “If your enemy is hungry, give him food, if thirsty, give him drink”. (Proverbs xxv. 21)10

According to this interpretation, the “an eye for an eye” pas- sage should be understood not as a mandate for punishment, but as a limit on what one can do in the name of retributive justice- that is, do no more in retribution than has been wrongly done to you. Anscombe goes on to add that the passages from the New Testament often cited as dictating pacifism are instead admonitions against wrongdoing and hatred, and they do not at all preclude the use of force as a legitimate means for administering justice.

Another difficulty for grounding pacifism in Christianity arises because of what is not said in the New Testament. Despite the presence of Roman soldiers throughout Palestine and numerous references to them in the New Testament (they are baptized by John the Baptist and provide Paul safe escort from Jerusalem to Caesarea), nowhere do we find soldiering prohibited or even frowned upon as a profession.

Ironically, the same text in which many have found the tenets of pacifism has provided for others the basis for the reprehensible, unconstrained violence of the Crusades. The pronouncement in Matthew, “You must not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword” (10:34); and Luke, “Whoever has a purse had better take it with him, and his pack too; and if he has no sword, let him sell his cloak to buy one”

Elizabeth Anscombe notes that the “an eye for an eye” passage is often misunderstood in this way:

Because of the ambiguity of the New Testament on the issues of warfare, military service, and using violence in the name of justice, many early Christians concluded that Christ’s nonresistance to the law meant a nonresistance to lawlessness. As adherents to Christianity grew, these beliefs regarding the laws of the state threatened the very fabric of communal order.

The requirement to respond to this early pacifism forced the Church to build upon the Roman notion of just use of force and to develop the tradition of jus ad bellum which we recognize today. By expressly permitting Christian participation in Just War, Church leaders such as Saints Ambrose and Augustine hoped to keep the new Holy Roman Empire under Constantine safe from invading barbarians, as we shall see in our subsequent discussions on the development of bellum justum.

Nevertheless, the Just War Doctrine that the early Christian theologians codified and developed continues to be a cause of consternation by those who argue that Christ’s message implies pfism. Modern defenders of Christian pacifism explain the development of early Just War Doctrine as a compromise between the practical or worldly notion of duty to society that was embodied in Roman traditions, with the ideal or utopian notion of purity of the soul that they found in the New Testament. They believe that pacifism is precisely what was compromised when Christianity became the official religion of the state.

James Turner Johnson argues convincingly that the development of the Christian Just War Tradition does not represent a com- promise between Christian and Roman values, but should more accurately be described as a synthesis of these values. Analysis of the writings of the early Christian scholars’ shows that all of them opposed war and violence per se and that the debate really centered on whether or not Christians might seek the temporal goods represented by the state.

Those who defended pacifism argued the position that Christians must hold themselves aloof from the affairs of this world in preparation for the next one. Those who advocated the notion of Just War, on the other hand, held that in some cases the quest for temporal goods might be a duty grounded in Christian ideals, 13

One example that illustrates this is Ambrose’s dictum that wrong behavior is not limited to just doing harm, but that it is also wrong to fail to prevent another from inflicting harm when one has the ability. As Ambrose puts it: “He who does not keep harm off a friend, if he can, is as much in fault as he who causes it.”14 Even though this statement is taken verbatim from Cicero (De Officiis, Bk. I, VII, 23), it would hardly do to call this a compromise of the values of the New Testament, especially since Ambrose rejects self- defense.

Instead, it should be understood as a principle that permits one to resolve conflicts in values: in this case the prohibition against the use of violence on one hand and the responsibility to protect the innocent based on the principle of brotherly love on the other. Johnson sums up the thrust of this development thus:

The achievement of just war theory was…to combine the general opposition to violence and bloodshed with a limited justification of the use of violence by Christians. This limited justification required that the use of force be to protect a value that could not otherwise be protected, and it justified military service as an instrument for such protection of value. The presumption against violence nonetheless remained, so that the justification could never become absolute: per- mission was always accompanied by limitation.

The central notion here is that the use of force requires justification-the presumption is always against violence-but violence may be permitted to protect other values. Hence the New Testament passages that advocate nonviolence might be taken to express a prima facie duty, rather than an absolute one (as the pacifists would have it).

One important consequence of such thinking is that the Roman legal notion of Just War is gradually replaced with a moral or religious notion where the forces of good combat the forces of evil. Saint Augustine, especially, expands the just causes for war by including those wars ordained by God.

Couple this with Pauline teaching that earthly political authority is divinely sanctioned and it is a short step to the Holy War, or Crusade. Likewise, the belief that God directly intervenes in or even orchestrates battles-a belief inspired by numerous biblical passages-permits one to view warfare as a kind of trial by combat between states with God tipping the scales in favor of the righteous.

Another consequence of these developments was the establishment of the Church as a unifying, political authority. This helped to undermine the notion that the will of the monarch was the sole source of law and justice in the temporal world. If the sovereign could be called to the bar to answer for his actions, then there must exist higher criteria, by which he might be judged-namely, God’s. Such criteria would, of course, apply to all monarchs: hence, ecclesiastical authority in political affairs.

In a later section we will see how Christian Just War theory evolves into a secular set of legal dicta similar to those of ancient Rome whence they originated but with considerably more detail. As we turn to the writing of Saint Ambrose (and Saint Augustine in the next chapter), we will attempt to distinguish the secular principles of bellum justum, generally originating in Greek and Roman works from those that has theological origins.

like: In The Old Days Only War

Saint Ambrose

Prior to becoming the Bishop of Milan, Ambrose occupied the position of Roman governor of northern Italy, essentially a military post. He viewed the Roman Empire as the warder of peace, the paxromana, and preached that the ongoing assaults on the empire by Germanic tribes were divinely inspired as retribution for Roman paganism. His primary importance for our study lies in his admonition to Christians that they not keep themselves aloof from the affairs of the state in anticipation of an imminent fulfillment of the eschatological promise-an argument that Augustine develops further in The City of God.

Borrowing heavily from Cicero, Ambrose outlines the duties that Christian citizens owe to their community. These duties are derived from the Four Cardinal Virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. One must manifest these virtues in his temporal life in order to attain eternal life:

It is certain that virtue is the only and the highest good; that it alone richly abounds in the fruit of a blessed life; that a blessed life, by means of which eternal life is won, does not depend on eternal or corporal benefits, but on virtue only. A blessed life is the fruit of the present, and eternal life is the hope of the future.

Ambrose adds that “what is useful is the same as what is virtuous” and that this may be “divided into what is useful for the body, and what is useful unto godliness.” Christians have a duty to do that which is useful or virtuous, both in terms of serving God and in their daily activities. This emphasis on the duties that Christians have in their temporal lives is at once a rebuttal to those Romans who accused Christians of inertia or apathy, and an admonition to those Christians who held themselves aloof from temporal affairs in anticipation of the eschatological Armageddon.

The dominant virtue is justice, and the examples that Ambrose uses to illustrate his message are especially revealing concerning his thinking on Just War theory. In a discussion on how these virtues are integrated and manifested in one’s daily life, Ambrose uses virtue in making battlefield decisions as his example, and in so doing provides us with his views on justum bellum. In a passage that reads like a modern treatise for military commanders on certain tactical and moral principles of warfare, he writes:

It is clear, then, that these [cardinal] and the remaining virtues are related to one another. For courage, which in war preserves one’s country from the barbarians, or at home defends the weak or comrades from robbers, is full of justice; and to know on what plan to defend and to give help, how to make use of opportunities of time and place, is the part of prudence and moderation, and temperance itself cannot observe due measure without prudence. To know a fit opportunity, and to make return according to what is right, belongs to justice.

By making justice most fundamental or the highest virtue, Ambrose lays the ground rules for how conflicts between competing duties should be arbitrated.

Likewise, his discussion of right conduct in war is developed in a discussion of the duties that are part of our temporal lives-such as the military duty for selfless service to the state. Concerning this duty to one’s country he writes:

We read, not only in the case of private individuals but even on kings. If anyone gains the people’s favor by advice or service, by fulfilling the duties of his ministry or office, or if he encounters danger for the sake of the whole nation, there is no doubt but that such love will be shown him by the people that they all will put his safety and welfare before their own.

In an example found in the same chapter from which the above quotation is taken, Ambrose discusses David (among others), who accepts the role of king against his wishes because it is his duty to do so. And in a remarkable passage, Ambrose holds up David’s actions in war as a model of jus in bello.

He had bound the people to himself freely in doing his duty…when he showed that he loved valor even in an enemy. He had also thought that justice should be shown to those who had borne arms against himself the same as to his own men and he admired Abner, the bravest champion of the opposing side whilst he was their leader and was yet waging war.

Nor did he despise him when suing for peace, but honored him by a banquet. When killed by treachery, he mourned and wept for him. He followed him and honored his obsequies, and evinced his good faith in desiring vengeance for the murder; for he handed on that duty to his son in the charge that he gave him, being anxious rather that the death of an innocent man should not be left avenged, than that any one should mourn for his own.

This passage is especially significant because it implies two principles that are key tenets in our modern notion of jus in bello. The first is that soldiers have a duty to the innocent even when it means the risk of their own lives. In this case that duty is manifested by David’s willingness to risk his son’s life in order to bring justice to the wrongdoer.

Second, Ambrose clearly notes that the guilt for initiating the war does not necessarily extend to those who are fighting it. This is the notion of moral equality among soldiers. David accepts Abner as a moral equal because of the way he fights in the war-independent of the rightness or wrongness of the war itself.

The message is that soldiers are to be respected (or punished) based on their conduct as soldiers even when they are members of the enemy’s forces. Because soldiers are judged by their actions on the battlefield, rather than in terms of the political considerations of the war itself, they are protected, rather than punished, when their status as combatants (that is, soldiers) is terminated, whether it is by capture, surrender, or injury.

In addition to the above principles that Ambrose introduces, he also borrows freely from Cicero’s ideas regarding jus in bello. Citing an example used by Cicero, he notes that virtue does not lie in victory, and that it is a shameful victory unless it is gained with honor. “In truth,” he adds, “it is a noble thing for a man to refuse to gain the victory by foul acts.”22 He also argues against excessive cruelty and admonishes Emperor Theodosius for needless bloodshed at the siege of Thessalonica.

I urge. I beg. I exhort, I warn…that you who were an example of unusual piety…should not mourn that so many have perished…. I dare not offer the sacrifice if you intend to be present. Is that which is not allowed after shedding the blood of one innocent person, allowed after shedding the blood of so many?

Ambrose, like Cicero, champions the notion of justice for the vanquished and distinguishes the innocent from the guilty among the enemy. Although these jus in bello principles do not appear in Augustine’s writing on Just War, they will be adopted by subsequent exponents of Just War theory and will thereby find their way into canon law.

As we read Ambrose we should remember that nowhere is his intention to provide a theory of when and how one should wage war-this he considers to be an obvious by-product of living a virtuous life. His point is to convince Christians that those who would attain the kingdom of heaven must live a virtuous life in the temporal world, and included in such a life is the duty to promote and, when necessary, enforce justice.

He believed unequivocally that Christians had a duty to support and defend the great empire that had brought peace and imposed order on the sin-ridden combative world. By remaining aloof from civil affairs one fails “to render unto Caesar” those things which are due him; and one of these duties is the requirement to contribute to the peace and justice of one’s com- munity-even by the use of arms if necessary. Of course, it was crucial that soldiers conduct themselves virtuously in the manner in which they fought.

One additional aspect of Ambrose’s work that warrants our attention, if only for its subsequent importance in Augustine’s Just War thinking, is God’s role in deciding the outcome of wars. Old Testament passages where God orders his chosen people to wage war and then grants them victory were not lost on either Ambrose or Augustine. In a treatise written at the request of Gratian, Emperor of the West, who was preparing to repel a Gothic invasion, Ambrose writes:

Go forth, sheltered, indeed, under the shield of faith, and gird with the sword of the spirit: go forth to the victory, promised of old time and foretold in oracles given by God….

No military eagles, no flights of birds, here lead the van of our army, but Thy Name. Lord Jesus and Thy worship. This is no land of unbelievers, but the land whose custom it is to send forth confessors Italy.

In the same work Ambrose blames earlier successes by the Goths against the empire on Roman paganism. Thus he argued that if Rome would reject paganism, God would protect Rome from the ravages of the barbarians. He quotes the prophecy found in Ezekiel 39 that the people of Israel will repulse an attack by the Gog, and concludes: “That Gog is the Goth, whose coming forth we have already seen, and over whom victory in days to come is promised. According to the word of the Lord.” This notion of divinely inspired wars constitutes a break with Cicero’s theory of Just War and will comprise a key element of Augustine’s idea of jus ad bellum.

Topics for Further Discussion

1. For some early Christian scholars, Christianity entailed positive duties as well as negative ones. How can such an interpretation of Christianity be used as an argument against pacifism? How might the same position be stretched in order to justify crusades?

2. Various forms of pacifism derive from the principle that it is always wrong to do harm to others. Elizabeth Anscombe objects to this principle because “it makes no distinction between the blood of the guilty and the blood of the innocent.” Develop an argument either attacking or defending Anscombe’s position.

3. Why does the view that political leaders are divinely appointed (or sanctioned) present a problem for Just War theory?

4. Ambrose tells us that good soldiers not only respect their enemies but that in some cases they also mourn enemy dead. Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.